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War in Africa, and in other parts of the world, has recently attracted significant attention given the cost of those conflicts in human lives and damage to national and regional economies. A growing and p roductive literature has emerged focussing on the motivations of rebels during these wars. Important econometric work has attempted to explain the economic and political motivations of rebels (Collier and Hoeffler: 1998) ; there have been case studies of different guerilla movements (e.g., Clapham: 1998) ; and cross-national analysis of the organization of rebellion (Herbst: 2000a) . However, there has been no corresponding literature on, quite literally, the other side: the political economy of how and why national militaries perform during civil war. This paper will examine the political and economic determinants of how African militaries face the threat of rebellion and of differential levels of effectiveness in combating insurgents. It will thus attempt to complement the literature that has recently emerged on rebellion with what might be called an examination of the industrial organization of counter-insurgency.
The paper argues that the particular threat posed by insurgency in Africa must be understood in order to analyze how militaries operate. By examining the life cycle of rebellion in Africa, I conclude that some economic models of the relationship between investments in national armies and combat cabilities are not applicable to the way wars are actually fought. In particular, it is difficult to associate investments in the military with force projection because it may only be possible early in an insurgency to defeat rebels through military means.
However, few African armies are able to mobilize quickly enough to defeat an insurgency in its early phases. At the same time, who the enemy is-especially whether citizens are asked to fight other citizens or foreigners-has an impact on the ability to mobilize in the face of a threat. Yet the characteristics of the enemy are often ignored when trying to model the military.
The Underdeveloped Study of Militaries
The failure to study militaries as important actors in rebellions is surprising. Indeed, the most obvious question concerning almost all the civil wars in Africa is: Why have militaries performed so poorly given that the actual armed threat post by rebels (who are often poorly organized, employ large number of child soldiers, and are inadequately funded) can best be described as pathetic? For instance, the Revolutionary United Front in Sierra Leone, while posing a persistent threat to the government in Freetown and adept at brutalizing civilians, was never much of a fighting force and was effectively deterred by the appearance of a few hundred British Marines and special forces units. Yet, very few African armies have won outright victories against rebels or have been able to change the military facts on the ground so that rebels would have to sue for peace.
Indeed, the conduct of militaries during civil wars is a critical determinant of the duration and course of conflict. Young makes the obvious point: "military factors, although often neglected by academics, have often determined the ultimate outcome of modern African insurgencies (1996, p. 179) ." Similarly, Russell noted in one of the rare systematic studies of rebellion "No mass rebellion can succeed without the defection of some of the regime's armed forces. . . In a situation where people are rebelling, the behavior of the armed forces has been shown to be a decisive factor in the outcome of the rebellion.
For revolutionaries to come to terms with this means that they must devote a great deal of thought to how to encourage defections from the police and the army (1974, p. 87) ." Similarly, Herbst (2000a) finds that the degree of threat post by the armed forces of the state is a critical determinant of how rebels will structure their own forces.
Unfortunately, beyond specialists writing for other security analysts, there is only a poorly developed literature on African militaries qua militaries. Most of the analysis on African militaries has focused on their roles in coups or as leaders of government because most armies on the continent have interfered far more often with their own political system than have fought on the battlefield.
Indeed, relatively few African militaries have had any experience in combat although that observation is less true than it was a generation ago given the number of African countries that are now at war. Thus, even the most critical questions regarding the competence of national militaries to fight have only been examined in a cursory manner. For instance, as William Thom notes, "The ability of African armies to expand their force levels in response to hostilities is not well understood, mostly because little is known about military reserves and mobilization systems. The response is to rate mobilization as very low if not nil (Thom: 1988, p. 20) ." More generally, Snyder claims that "There is no welldefined relationship between a nation's security and its own and other states' military expenditures (Snyder: 1986, p. 119 ).
Understanding African Militaries
There are hints in the literature that militaries do not only fight for the public good but also have economic agendas (Reno: 2000) . However, there has been no systematic study of how militaries operate from a political economy perspective. The implicit assumption in the literature has been that while rebels may have a host of motivations beyond their stated political and ideological aims, militaries in Africa and elsewhere defend the state. For instance, Grossman argues, "The function of the soldiers is to protect the income of the ruler's clientele either by deterring the potential insurgent leader from organizing an insurrection or by counteracting actual insurgents (Grossman: 1995, p. 194) ."
Olson has in many ways provided the best description of why rulers provide security. In his model, if a leader is strong enough to hold territory and monopolize theft--what Olson calls a "stationary bandit--" he has an interest in his domain prospering. Olson argues that, "This encompassing interest leads him to [the leader] . . . spend some of the resources that he controls on public goods that benefit his victims no less than himself. . . he prohibits the murder or maiming of his subjects. . . He serves his interests by spending some of the resources that he controls to deter crime among his subjects and to provide other public goods (Olson: 2000, p . 10) ." This is an important explanation of how a secure environment develops without having to assume good intentions on the part of the leader. However, Olson does not suggest how even a leader with significant interests in providing security can actually go about doing it. Indeed, Olson appears to make a series of unexplored assumptions about how leaders can keep control over their security forces and have them continue to fight for him when there are clear private gains to be made by the men with guns if they follow their own agenda and not the leaders.
It is generally assumed that armies can be modeled using an easily recognizable function that relates competence in combat to the inputs allocated to the military. Thus, in Hirshleifer's model, there is a "combat power function" in which resources devoted to combat readiness determine success in appropriation (1988, p. 207) . Similarly, Polo describes a "black box" where, "We assume military capacity to be an increasing function of the number of members of the organization: all the relevant functions-monitoring, intelligence and violence-require labor as a fundamental input (Polo: 1995, p. 89) ." However, it is important to note that Polo also includes a spatial dimension that complicates the simple input model: "The second key feature is related to the spatial dimension in which the military activity takes place: when an organization is trying to hit a target, all the preliminary steps and the final violent action increase in complexity with the distance of the target (Polo: 1995, p. 89) ." This (relatively rare) acknowledgement of the spatial dimension of conflict is important and, as will be noted below, particularly appropriate to the kind of conflict African armies are now fighting.
The problem with the relatively simple view of military prowess being related to inputs is that it does not fit the observable facts. In countries where all institutions are weak, armies cannot simply be assumed to just fight for leaders.
Indeed, national armies are often the most significant threats that leaders face.
More generally, whether soldiers will risk their lives for a leader who may or may not have paid them in the previous few months is a complicated question. Also, classic questions of morale and esprit de corps-the obsession of many leaders have even highly institutionalized armies-are always difficult to judge. Thus, Thom has written, "Whether an army will fight rather than flee when faced with organized armed opposition is both the simplest yet most difficult judgment to make. In some instances the answer will differ depending on the nature of the type of threat and the foe (Thom: 1988, p. 12) ." Indeed, warfare in Africa is often not so much a question of who dominates the battlefield but who runs away first.
For instance, during Laurent Kabila's march on Kinshasa in 1997, the favored rebel strategy was not to fight the national army but to devise methods that would allow the government's forces to implement their preferred strategy of continua l retreat. This usually meant that the rebels would not completely encircle the government forces but would usually leave a corridor for the troops to exit, however ungracefully. Thus, as the rebels approached a town, the Zairian forces would "panic, loot, then flee toward the next town where the process would be Inevitably, the picture of African militaries in general decline becomes more complicated when the focus is placed on individual countries. Table one arrays African countries according to the change in the size of their armies over the last decade and does demonstrate a decline in the armed forces of most countries. Indeed, most forces did experience a reduction not only in manpower but also in underlying capabilities. As William C. Thom stated:
Most African state armies are in decline, beset by a combination of shrinking budgets, international pressures to downsize and demobilize, and the lack of the freely accessible military assistance that characterized the cold war period. With few exceptions, heavy weapons lie dormant, equipment is in disrepair, and training is almost nonexistent. . . . the principal forces of order are in disorder in many countries at a time when the legitimacy of central governments (and indeed sometimes the state) is in doubt (Thom: 1995, p. 3).
For instance, a parliamentary report on Zimbabwe's army-long thought to be one of the most competent militaries on the continent-found that the force had only five percent of its vehicles in working order, monthly pilot training had been abandoned, and seventy percent of the troops in one brigade had been off duty for a year or more, on forced leaves to save money (Harare Zimbabwe Standard: 1998).
Increasingly, weak or failing states find it difficult to even pay key elements of their security apparatus, causing a gradual decay in public order. Low or negative per capita economic growth in many African countries suggests that this sort of gradual dissolution will become even more common in the future. At the same time, a few African countries have developed unprecedented abilities to project force in other countries even while they are unable to control their own territory. The ability of the Angolan military to move forces in division size echelons to attack the regime of Patrick Lissouba in Congo-Brazzaville in 1997 was perhaps the best indication of the new capabilities of a small number of African militaries to operate away from their own borders. Yet, at the same time, the Angolan military has been unable to defeat the UNITA insurgency in the southern part of its own country. The ability of Uganda, Rwanda, Zimbabwe and Namibia all to operate forward positions in Democratic Republic of Congo also suggests that at least a handful of countries can operate in foreign theaters although the internal defenses of these countries remains problematic. Indeed, Uganda has become a significant military force in the Democratic Republic of Congo even while it is unable to defeat insurgents coming into its own territory from Sudan. As will be explained below, there are good reasons why countries may decide to gain greater competencies in foreign adventurism than in internal defense.
Threat Analysis
To better understand how African armies actually fight, and when they will fight, it is important to understand the threat they face and their ability to respond.
Of course, the actual analysis of the relationship between the deployment of soldiers, the use of coercion, and victory is, not surprisingly, a very difficult set o f issues to understand. As Brockett notes, "The consequences of government repression for mass protest and rebellion have been the subject of much scholarly attention. Theories have been advanced for linear relationships, but in both negative and positive directions. Curvilinear relationships have also been proposed, again with the curves running in both directions. Each of these four models have found some empirical support-but also contradiction-from a variety of cross-national aggregate data studies (Brockett: 1995, p. 118) ." In order to get out of this analytic box, it is particularly important to describe the particular circumstances of combat in Africa and the possible strategies of rebels and of national armies.
The context of most African countries about to experience conflict is that intelligence of what is happening on the ground is weak. In Africa, even countries with relatively well-resourced security and intelligence agencies often do not understand how they have been penetrated by insurgents until after the fighting has begun. For instance, the presence of cells of the terrorist Osama bin Laden in Kenya, revealed after the US Embassy in Nairobi was blown-up in 1998, appears to have come as a surprise to the authorities. Similarly, South African authorities have been generally unsuccessful in understanding the degree to which foreign Muslim powers have developed ties with PAGAD, a local vigilante/criminal gang. Countries with fewer intelligence resources often have little idea that conflict is about to begin within their own territory.
Initial phases of insurgency
While every insurgency, like every unhappy family, is different, some generalizations about the threat facing national armies across Africa can be made. Insurgencies generally start small. The eleven men who started the fighting in Eritrea (Pateman: 1998, p. 117) , the famous twenty-seven fighters who began the National Resistance Movement's campaign in Uganda (Museveni: 1986, p. 7) , the approximately one hundred soldiers of the National Patriotic Front that crossed into Liberia with Charles Taylor (Ellis: 1999, p. 110) , the thirty-five trained soldiers who started the RUF in Sierra Leone (Abdullah and Muana: 1998, p. 177) , the two hundred and fifty that started FRELIMO (FRELIMO: 1982, p. 147) are representative of how vulnerable and small rebel movements are at the beginning. Of course, many rebel movements are defeated early or simply collapse from their internal divisions, never to be heard from again. As a result, rebel leaders are, literally from the start, acutely conscious of the coercive power of the state and opportunities to seek refuge from the state.
It is at this early stage, of course, that an insurgency is most likely to be defeated. Brockett concludes from Central America: "during 'normal conditions' that is, prior to the onset of a protest cycle, escalating repression will deter popular mobilization against the regime. In contrast, in the ascendant phase of the protest cycle, the same repression is likely to provoke increased mass oppositional activities (1995, p. 134) ." It is not surprising that when the cost of repression fall heavily on members of a small rebel movement that they are individually deterred (if not killed outright) but that governments find it impossible to keep the cost of repression for each individual from falling as insurgent group size begins to grow rapidly.
For African militaries, even rebellions in the relatively vulnerable early stages are difficult to defeat. Given how weak intelligence systems are and how small the insurgencies are at the beginning, it is necessary to mobilize a significant amount of firepower in a short period of time to fight rebels when they are most vulnerable. Indeed, militaries with intelligence services far more capable than African states routinely mistake insurgents for criminals in the early days of a rebellion, thereby delaying the implementation of a counter-insurgency campaign (Rich and Stubbs: 1997, p. 7) . African militaries are far less capable than the national forces in Central America and they often operate over much larger territories. The very smallness of insurgencies also makes them difficult to detect and defeat and African countries are unlikely to have the necessary intelligence assets and co-ordinated police/military capabilities to undertake surgical strikes.
As a result, African militaries rely on relatively blunt strikes in the hope of defeating even small groups. Also, given that the basic local political structures of most African counties are so underdeveloped, they usually cannot marry force projection with a nuanced political strategy: they have no carrots, only sticks.
Indeed, the state finds any kind of local vision that might emerge from even a proto-insurgency movement to be extremely threatening (Watts: 1997, p. 36) . 
Mature insurgencies
If the small rebel group survives this initial onslaught, the government must fight a more classic type of counter-insurgency war. As hard as it is for African militaries to fight small gangs of insurgents, more widespread warfare involving larger echelons of troops is even more difficult. As Thom once again notes,
Counterinsurgency is a most difficult job for any military to perform, and it requires African armies to perform in areas where they are the weakest;
i.e., aggressive, multiple field operations with little short term payoff that must be sustained over long periods to achieve the ultimate goal. This requires good logistic support, mobility, maintenance, training in small unit tactics, good leadership, especially at the junior officer and NCO levels, and an ability to integrate military intelligence with field operations (Thom: 1988, p. 7).
In addition, counter-insurgency places significant demands on a government to co-ordinate the (very difficult) military tasks with a comprehensive political strategy. The United States' own doctrinal statement on low-intensity conflict suggests just how difficult developing a comprehensive political/military counterinsurgency campaign can be:
(Internal defense and development) focuses on building viable political, economic, military, and social institutions that respond to the needs of society. Its fundamental goal is to prevent insurgency by forestalling and defeating the threat insurgent organizations impose and by working to correct conditions that prompt violence. . . The government often must overcome the inertia and incompetence of its own political system before it can cope with the insurgency against this system. This may involve the adoption of reforms during times of crisis, when pressures limit flexibility and make implementation difficult (Departments of the Army and Air Force: 1990, pp. 9 -10).
Rebels generally have more choices as an insurgency proceeds. Indeed, "It is relatively easy in military terms to operate successfully as a guerrilla force against a black African state: strategic soft targets such as rail lines, bridges, oil pipelines, power stations and transmission lines are difficult to protect, yet their destruction has great economic and psychological impact (Thom: 1988, p. 8) ."
This mode of attack allows guerillas to strategically retreat from the armed forces of the state rather than have to fight, making counter-insurgency all the more difficult. As Yoweri Museveni noted during his struggle for power in Uganda, "Loss of territory is, at this stage, of no consequence. In our case, the more important considerations are the preservation and expansion of our forces by avoiding unnecessary casualties, and destroying the enemy's means of making war. . . (Museveni: 1986, p. 12) ." As the conflict cycle proceeds, the tasks of rebels become relatively easier while the government finds it increasingly difficult to fight. After the initial flurry of combat that reflects the government's initial attempt to obliterate the rebels and the insurgents' desire to inflict a psychological wound on the army, rebels often establish a base in the countryside to organize a mobile force and recruit new soldiers. This was the pattern of insurgents in Rwanda, Uganda and the Popular Movement for Salvation in Chad. After logistical lines are consolidated, a push for the capital is made. Some governments are so weak that they cannot defeat even this lightening strike and the capital is overrun. Small countries are particularly vulnerable to this type of two-phase campaign (see generally, Young: 1996, p.
185).
Of course, many insurgents are not able to adopt a quick capital-first strategy and get mired in the countryside. This may occur because of the government is able to provide point defense of the major city or because the territory is so big that the rebel's base is far enough from the capital that their limited logistical ability cannot triumph over unyielding geography (e.g., Angola, Sudan). At this point, it is possible that a stalemate begins that can continue for many years. On the hand, the rebels cannot defeat the government because defeat is defined by the international community as militarily occupying the capital (See, generally, Herbst: 2000b) . On the other hand, the military perquisites for fighting a protracted counter-insurgency campaign are simply beyond the capabilities of most African militaries.
As a result, African states based in capitals and guerrillas anchored in relatively large countrysides often reach a kind of equilibrium. The government knows that it is too costly to attack the guerillas in order to defeat them and therefore can define a territory that it can defend. It will be politically viable as long as it controls the capital and some other towns. For instance, the Rhodesian notion of "vital area ground--" territory whose capture or control would result in or significantly contribute to national defeat--was developed in the terminal stages of that national liberation struggle in what is now Zimbabwe.
Specification of what territory Salisbury had to control allowed a significant portion of the countryside to be ceded to guerrillas. In fact, as figure two (from the Rhodesian central military authorities) demonstrates, a country's leadership in the midst of a brutal war can tolerate Figure 2 about here significant losses of territory without conceding defeat. However, the Rhodesian strategy, while preventing outright military defeat, did not allow for victory because small groups of guerrillas could easily operate in territory that was not considered vital and thereby gain popular allegiance (Cilliers: 1985, p. 249) .
Similarly, the French, as figure three suggests, tolerated a significant erosion of their territory in Algeria before finally conceding defeat. Many other
Figure 3 about here
African governments have at various times lost significant control over their hinterlands but remained in power because they had physical control of the state.
Thus, President Mobutu of Zaire was really little more than the mayor of Kinshasa in his declining years while the governments of Sudan, Angola, and Mozambique, among others, have lost control over significant parts of their territory over many years although were not militarily defeated.
The model presented here directly contradicts significant assumptions of some of the political economy models of conflict. For instance, in Hirshleifer's model that military forces are used when the decisiveness of conflict is "sufficiently great ((1991, p. 197) ." The problem with that model is that it does not recognize the life cycle of insurgency and counter-insurgency. Military force may only be sufficiently great to actually defeat insurgencies in Africa at the very beginning of the conflict but that will be precisely the time that many armies will be unable to deploy. Hirshleifer assumes that military assets are always available and can be deployed at any time. Such an assumption is unrealistic for conflicts in Africa. More generally, the "blackbox" model of relating military prowess to inputs simply fails to take account the growing disutility of military forces as insurgencies progress.
The Ability to Mobilize
The ability of an African army to defeat rebels therefore greatly depends on its ability to mobilize forces relatively quickly in the face of a growing enemy threat. If it is able to mobilize and deploy the agents of violence, there is some chance that it can crush an insurgency while the rebels are still particularly vulnerable. However, as time goes on, it becomes increasingly difficult to fight an insurgency and states therefore become vulnerable to outright defeat (especially if they have a relatively small territorial base and face relatively adept rebel fighters) or a prolonged war which neither side can win but which will almost surely devastate the country. Indeed, a particularly important reason for militaries to defeat insurgencies early on is so that leaders do not simply become accustomed to the idea of becoming "stationary bandits" over smaller and smaller pieces of their own territory and not even be interested in gaining control over their own territory. The international community will tolerate this type of shirking of responsibility but it is usually disastrous for the country. Table 2 1982 1984 1990 9.2 6.9 7.4 6.75.6 Sudan 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 4.5 4.3 4 2.9 2.8 Uganda 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 0.7 0 1979 1981 1983 1987 1989 7.2 7.6 7.4 8.7 9.4 12.9 Ethiopia 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1.8 6.1 6.5 6 4.5 Mozambique 1979 Mozambique 1981 Mozambique 1983 Mozambique 1985 Mozambique 1987 Mozambique 1989 2.4 2.4 2.8 4.6 4. 6 Rwanda 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 0.8 4.1 4 3.9 6 5.5 Somalia 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 9.4 16.1 15.4 9.2 7.7 Source: Calculated from U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, various years.
column five be the year in which the enemy threat became most obvious, although some of the conflicts do not lend themselves to such neat chronologies. 1998 not because Eritrea was failing but because of a complex set of commercial and political conflicts between the two countries. Eritrea was therefore able to mobilize against the Ethiopia attack although it did suffer a significant defeat.
Of course, it may also be easier to mobilize the population in the face of an external threat. Indeed, the presence of a palpable external threat may be the strongest way to generate a common association between the state and the population. External threats have suc h a powerful effect on nationalism because people realize in a profound manner that they are under threat because of who they are as a nation; they are forced to recognize that it is only as a nation that they can successfully defeat the threat. Anthony Giddens recounts the effects of World War I: "The War canalized the development of states' sovereignty, tying this to citizenship and to nationalism in such a profound way that any other scenario [of how the international system would be ordered] subsequently came to appear as little more than idle fantasy (Giddens: 1987, p. 235 Germany was Gravelotte and Sedan (Howard: 1978, p. 9 . Emphasis in the original).
Inevitably, it is much more difficult to mobilize a population during a civil war given that the conflict itself reflects fundamental dissatisfactions with the existing political order.
Finally, African countries may be able to mobilize to attack other countries, even while the security of their existing homeland is not guaranteed, simply because the territory in other countries may be more valuable than their own homelands. As noted above, large countries especially, can afford to have insurgents control significant amounts of territory as long as they did not threaten the capital. At the same time, territory in adjoining countries, or the policies of those neighbors, may be more important to control or influence. For instance, the government in Luanda probably felt it more important to intervene to guarantee the course of events in Brazzaville-itself relatively close to Luandaeven while the rebellion in the far south of Angola continued. Similarly, Uganda seems to have thought it more important to try to change security arrangements in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo than in its own north, probably because events in eastern Congo posed a more significant threat to Kampala.
There have also been repeated reports-almost all unconfirmed-that Uganda and other countries operating in DRC have been able to recoup some of their expenses through theft of natural resources. While such cost recovery is much harder than most people believe-running a mine is no guarantee of profit in the Congo, as many other failed businesses have discovered-it may very well be the case that controlling some territory of adjoining countries is potentially more lucrative than defense of the homeland.
Again, models which try to associate the input of resources with military prowess will not necessary predict correctly how African countries will react.
Mobilization in the face of an enemy is difficult and the ability to convince people 
Conclusion
This analysis of African militaries suggests that wars in Africa are far harder to end than models which relate inputs to military prowess suggest.
Perhaps the only time when African armies-given their precarious state and their difficulties in mobilizing to face domestic conflict-may have a good chance of defeating an insurgency is at the start of hostilities. Of course, that is precisely when African militaries are least prepared to fight. It is also important for insurgencies to be defeated early because leaders may simply fight it to their advantage to withdraw from territory and rule over less rather than fight hard as the insurgency continues.
From a policy perspective, these findings may suggest that the optimal level of investment in the military and security forces is higher than usually believed. If it is essentially too late to invest in the military once fighting has begun in earnest-at least in domestic conflicts-African countries may have to have invest in more competent standing forces which could be used at the start of an insurgency. However, such an investment in preparedness would also mean that funds would often be used to ready an army that, as it turns out, would not have an enemy to fight. The opportunity cost of such an investment would therefore be quite high. 
